Yesterday, The Times (paywall) reported that Kemi Badenoch lost her Christian faith because of *checks notes* Josef Fritzl. In summary, her position appears to be something like this:
- I used to pray for trivial stuff and God answered my prayer
- Elisabeth Fritzl prayed for rescue and God didn’t answer her prayer
- Therefore, I do not believe in God
It is really hard to know where to start with this. Let’s just dissect this a little.
First, this is in no way a logical argument. None of the premises of the argument necessarily follow one another. Stated in sum, they are just three non-sequiturs. All three things might be true, but they they aren’t in any way directly related to one another. Moreover, the actual premises themselves can be questioned on their own terms. For example, if a thing happens that a person has prayed for, is that necessarily God ‘answering their prayer’? Even the premises themselves are not necessarily true.
Second, leaving aside the logical coherence of the argument, the conclusion does not necessarily follow. If Premise A insists God answers trivial prayer and Premise B insists God does not answer serious prayer, we cannot conclude God does not exist on that basis. The most we could conclude, if we concede the premises, is that God doesn’t seem to answer prayers in a way that we find good or helpful. It does nothing to show the reality of a God who exists; it at best tells you a little bit about what God might be like. Even then, we would be extrapolating based on our not liking how he chooses to answer prayer the reasons for it. Even at the level presented here, the principle of sufficient reason undercuts even the potentials claims that God is necessarily inept or morally evil.
Third, it doesn’t take a lot of digging to find fault with the premises on their own terms. What Badenoch gives us is two examples of God answering trivial prayers and yet ignoring other far more serious ones. But it isn’t hard to simply switch the premises. There are also plenty of examples of people praying really quite serious prayers that did come to pass and also of people praying remarkably trivial ones that did not happen. Given that you can find counter-examples of both premises means the most you can conclude here is that sometimes God does answer those serious prayers in ways that we might hope he would and he sometimes doesn’t answer those trivial prayers. Taken in the round, all we are left with is one question: why might this be the case? We are thrown back to the principle of sufficient reason.
Fourth, there is nothing new about this argument. This is the old problem of evil rearing its head again. I won’t rehash the various theodicies and challenges on either side of this question. What surprises is that Badenoch was compelled by the case of Josef Fritzl to but seemingly not so moved by WWI or WWII, the Holocaust, the Great Purge, the Great Leap Forward, The Killing Fields of Cambodia and on and on. Not only that, these are all modern examples. History is full of suffering and evil. Both apparently religious-inspired and non-religious. It is why challenges and theodicies exist among Greek philosophers and well predate them with Jewish, Buddhist and Hindu texts all addressing this question. The surprising thing is not that Badenoch has struggled with the problem of evil, it is that vastly worse examples from much longer ago did nothing to rock her faith. One example, that is objectively heinous and yet less significant than those cited above, caused her to deny God using what can only be described as risible logic. It just seems so fatuous.
None of that is to deny the very real question of evil and suffering. This is a genuine problem for many people and it is an issue that has been wrestled with for centuries. I am not arguing that every concern about evil and suffering is nonsense nor that there are no credible challenges theologically and philosophically for theists to answer. It is simply to say that Badenoch does not provide any of them or give any sense of meaningful interaction with them. Rather, she offers only jejune argument poorly reasoned.
Taking her argument on its own terms, I can only conclude that the faith Badenoch claimed to have was an entirely superficial one. Such faith when faced with the reality of the world in which we live is always going to crumble. If we have no meaningful answer for basic questions, and our essential position is that God hasn’t answered every prayer as I assume he ought, and we think no more deeply about our faith than that, it is little wonder that it will do very little for us in the long run. That kind of superficial faith is – entirely understandably – not the kind of thing you can build your life upon. Equally, that sort of superficial faith does not have the depth and roots to weather even the most basic of challenges. It is hardly surprising that such faith gets jettisoned. Badenoch’s claim to remains a ‘cultural Christian’ shows only that this is not Christianity in any meaningful sense at all.
The big challenge for churches here is to make sure that we are discipling our people well. We need to prepare our people for the big questions and challenges of life. In fact, I would go as far as to say, if the bible does not have credible answers for the basic realities of life, we cannot blame people if they find it an unreliable guide and a shaky foundation on which to build their lives. Ministers of the gospel surely must believe that the God who is there and the gospel as revealed full in Christ does have credible answers and is a reliable foundation for us. If that is true, we need to make that clear to our people. We need to teach the Bible well, show them what it does say and how these things are credible so that when elementary questions are raised they are not flummoxed to the point of denying the faith altogether.
Of course, that doesn’t mean we will necessarily be able to answer every question every person ever has to their satisfaction. Indeed, scripture itself does not claim to offer that. What we need to do is teach our people what claims the scriptures do make and show them that these things are both cogent and credible. We need to show people how to read the Bible well so that they can understand the claims it does make and the answer it seeks to offer. We need to teach our people to theologise well so that they can draw together biblical teaching and reach credible theological conclusions based on what God reveals about himself and the world. We similarly need to disciple people well enough so that even if they don’t have specific answers to the particular questions they might be asking, the bible will tell them all that they need to know in order to know God, live according to his purpose and operate faithfully in the world as it really is.
KB’s account though reflects something that seems to be a risk to many. John Stevens has picked up on this in a Facebook post. How often do we hear people say that they are losing their faith either because they experience suffering or because they find one issue of suffering troubling. How many examples of suffering have gone by unnoticed until that point?
Yes, I picked up on that point in the post.
Dare we go so far as to say that there is something a little selfish or at least inward looking. I’m okay with suffering until it affects me. I think that you are right with Badenoch that it is still trivial. Not that the example is trivial but rather that the problem only becomes a problem when the case comes up that she can’t make sense of. It remains about her. I say this not to pick on her (though obviously the shallowness of thinking doesn’t bode well for s politician who has made their stich about systemic long term thinking. I’m not sure we have seen much evidence yet, rather that this again reflects the temptation and challenge for us all.
Oh yes, selfish thinking for sure. I have seen others fine with the problem of suffering until one of their loved ones dies and then their faith is rocked. While it is other people’s problems, I can intellectually satisfy myself (or just ignore it altogether) but when something upsets me, it’s suddenly not fair and not reasonable, even if what affects me is objectively not as serious and eminently more normal.
My parents were not believers, but when I was 5 or 6 I distinctly recall coming to believe in God from the witness of creation. “He must be very great who made all this,” was the thought I remember thinking. Thereafter I was never able to believe in evolution.
But… when I was 10 or 11, I learned of the Holocaust. I found it deeply disturbing ( and still do). I realised I would either have to jettison my belief in God, or modify my understanding of God to accommodate the unpalatable truth that such evil could exist in His world. I think this may have laid the foundation for a healthy fear of God.
It was years later that I became a Christian.
You’re absolutely correct to suggest that as disciples we need a sound theology of suffering…. But I have found that it’s a subject I’ve had to revisit and agonise over time and again.. Confronted by the sufferings around me… and often the sufferings of godly Christians, I can’t really say I can see reasons or I have adequate answers….
I think ultimately it is really a matter of faith… of believing and trusting…
I think that is right. The real question is not, ‘is there a God because people suffer?’ That is a non-sequitur. The real question is, ‘can God still be good even though people suffer?’
I think the Bible does offer an answer to that. Namely, the world he originally created was very good but it has been marred by sin. A good God then has a choice whether to destroy it or bear with it and find a solution to the suffering now caused by humankind. His answer was to be patient and set forth Jesus so that the world can be redeemed. Which, however you cut it, makes him seems pretty good to me.
Succinctly and sweetly put….
“ For example, if a thing happens that a person has prayed for, is that necessarily God ‘answering their prayer’? Even the premises themselves are not necessarily true.”
I don’t think this is a counter-example to her. It seems to me that she starts with the idea of no-God as neutral, but was rejecting it on the basis of answered prayers. And the point of the Fritzl example is to suggest that God doesn’t answer prayers. So if you start off suggesting that he wasn’t answering her prayers, then she can simply reject belief even sooner.
I think your broader point if discipleship is key, and part of that is to have people intellectually satisfied in a God-fearing Bible-believing culture. I think in part Kemi is the victim of atheism’s complete cultural victory that they had at that sort of time.
I understand what you are saying. The quoted part is just to address the premise on its own terms. God does lots of things that we don’t pray for and does things that are not necessarily a response to prayer. My point is simply that a rejection of answered prayer does not lead to no God.